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Immortalist wrote:
> Universal skepticism is usually stated in one of two ways.
>
> ------------------------------------
> [1] - Positive Universal Skepticism:
>
> In its positive form it consists
> of the doctrine that man
> can know nothing.
>
> This belief can be easily dismissed, because anyone who defends it
> finds himself immersed in hopeless absurdities.
>
> In asserting that there is no knowledge, the skeptic is asserting a
> knowledge claim-which according to his own theory is impossible.
>
> The universal skeptic wishes to
> claim truth for a theory that
> denies man's ability to arrive
> at truth, and this puts the
> skeptic in the unenviable
> position of uttering
> nonsense.
>
> ...he cannot even begin to argue for his position, because the
> "possibility of knowledge is presupposed in the very possibility of
> argument, in the very possibility of having recourse to reasons." [8]
> As Francis Parker explains:
>
> There is such a
> thing as knowledge.
>
> The assertion of this proposition is necessarily true if there is to be
> any assertion at all, for its contradictory is self-contradictory.
>
> If the assertion
> "There is no knowledge"
> is true, then it is false
>
> ...for that assertion itself purports to be an instance of knowledge.
> Thus the only alternative to the recognition of the existence of
> knowledge is, as Aristotle said, a return to the vegetative state where
> no assertions whatever can be made.
>
> ---------------------------------------
> [2] - Negative Universal Skepticism:
>
> The second form of universal skepticism
> consists of the doctrine that we must
> doubt every alleged instance
> of knowledge.
>
> Through this negative formulation,
>
> the universal skeptic seeks to avoid
> the contradiction of asserting a
> knowledge claim while denying
> the existence of knowledge.
>
> But the doctrine that we should doubt every knowledge claim
> translates_into the positive assertion that man can never attain
> certainty-and this version of skepticism fares no better than the
> preceding.
>
> We must ask if this "principle of
> universal doubt" is itself certain,
> or is it open to doubt as well?
>
> If it is known with certainty, at
> least one thing is beyond doubt,
> which makes the principle false.
>
> If, however, the principle is
> open to doubt-i.e., if it
> is not certain-then on what
> grounds can the skeptic claim
> greater plausibility for his
> theory than any other?
>
> The logician C. N. Bittle elaborates on this problem:
>
> Skeptics either have valid reasons for their universal doubting, or
> they have no valid reasons for it.
>
> If they have valid reasons, they
> surely know something that is
> valid, and they no longer
> are real skeptics.
>
> If they have no valid reasons,
> they have no reason to doubt.
>
> In the first case their position is inconsistent, and in the second
> case their position is irrational. Whichever way they turn, their
> position is untenable.
>
> Why, according to the universal skeptic, should every knowledge claim
> be doubted? "Because," he will reply, "man is capable of error, and it
> is possible in any given instance that he has committed an error." We
> must remember, however, that
>
> "error" (or falsehood) is the
> opposite of "truth"-and the
> skeptic who appeals to error
> implicitly admits that a
> proposition cannot be true
> and false, correct and
> incorrect, at the same
> time and in the same
> respect.
>
> Thus, whether he likes it or
> not, the skeptic must surrender
> to the logical principle known
> as the Law of Contradiction (which
> states that a proposition cannot
> be true and false at the same
> time and in the same respect).
>
> ...therefore, the skeptic must
> concede the validity of the Law
> of Contradiction and its corollaries:
>
> the Law of Identity (A is A,
> a thing is itself) and
>
> the Law of the Excluded Middle
> (something is either A or not-A).
>
> ...the main source of confusion in the skeptical approach: the equation
> of knowledge and certainty with infallibility.
>
> When the skeptic claims that every knowledge claim should be doubted
> because man is capable of making mistakes, he is simply pointing out
> the obvious: that man is a fallible being.
>
> No one, not even the most resolute
> antiskeptic, will deny the point
> that man is fallible. (We must
> wonder, though, how the skeptic
> arrived at this knowledge. Is
> he certain that man is fallible?)
>
> The skeptic fails to realize that it is precisely man's fallibility
> that generates the need for a science of knowledge. If man were
> infallible-if all knowledge were given to him without the slightest
> possibility of error-then the need for epistemological guidelines
> with which to verify ideas, with which to sort the true from the false,
> would not arise. Man requires a method to minimize the possibility of
> error, and this is the function of epistemology. A science of knowledge
> enables us to discriminate between justified and unjustified beliefs;
> and since the beliefs of an infallible being would not stand in need of
> verification, he could have no use for epistemological standards. Where
> infallibility is involved, concepts such as truth, falsity, certainty
> and uncertainty are stripped of any possible application.
>
> Consider the basic argument of the skeptic. We have seen that
> fallibility gives rise to epistemological guidelines used to
> distinguish truth from falsity, certainty from uncertainty, and so
> forth. The skeptic, however, starts from the same premise-that man is
> fallible-and uses it to argue that man can never achieve truth and
> certainty. It is because man is capable of error that he must
> distinguish truth from falsehood, certainty from doubt. "But," argues
> the skeptic, "it is because man is capable of error that he can never
> attain truth and certainty."
>
> The skeptic thus turns epistemology
> on its head by using the foundation
> for a science of knowledge-human
> fallibility-as a weapon to argue,
> in effect, that a science of
> knowledge is impossible
> to man.
>
> Even if the universal skeptic could consistently adhere to his position
> (which he cannot), his victory would be an empty one. His claim that
> man cannot acquire knowledge and certainty reduces to the claim that
> man is fallible-and this tells us nothing new, except that the
> skeptic prefers to use epistemological terms while totally ignoring
> their context.
>
> Since man is not infallible, any
> concepts of "knowledge" or "certainty"
> that require infallibility are, for
> that very reason, inapplicable to man
> and totally irrelevant to
> human epistemology.
>
> Even if the skeptical position made sense, it would fail to tell us
> anything concerning human knowledge and human certainty-which removes
> it from the realm of serious consideration.
>
> In summary, we have indicted universal skepticism on two counts: first,
> because it cannot be maintained without contradiction and, second,
> because it commits what we shall hereafter refer to as
>
> The Infallibilist Fallacy;
>
> the equation of episte-mological
> terms, such as "knowledge" and
> "certainty," with a standard of
> infallibility, which is completely
> inappropriate to man and to the
> science of knowledge in general.
>
> Atheism: The Case Against God
> George H. Smith
> http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/087975124X/
i found this quote in one of the review's interesting.
"ATHEISM IS NOT A PROOF THAT GOD DOES NOT EXIST. INSTEAD IT IS THE
ASSERTION THAT THEISM DOES NOT PROVIDE AN ADEQUATE PROOF OF THE
EXISTENCE OF GOD"
This is were faith fills the gap.
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