On 7/12/05, Alex Zinin <[email protected]> wrote:
> >> >>This policy suggested for fragments seems to be merely the same policy
> >> >>that could be applied to all packets, whether fragments or not.
> Not for all, but for all Unknown, and yes, my original comments did say
> that for Unknown too.
Given that implementing GTSM for a particular protocol is to try and
protect it against such DOS attacks, letting the fragments have to
compete for resources with Unknown seems to make this much less useful
- as far as the multi-hop case goes.
> >> >Good idea; if the application protocol were to always set the DF bit, then
> >> >there should not be fragments to receive...
Are there protocols where it is the case that both fragments are
commonly seen and the multi-hop case is necessary?
> >> Alternately, if one were only doing single-hop GTSM, then trusting
> >> fragments with a TTL of 255 wouldn't be a concern.
> Right. It's straight-forward with single-hop. With multi-hop, we should be
> able to tell Unknowns from Dangerous.
Since it is straight-forward with single-hop, why don't we call this
out in the draft as a special case where fragments with TTL=255 are
trusted? At least that makes the single-hop case more useful.
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