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is very fine. Yes, I must
wager; but I may perhaps wager too much." Let us see. Since there is an
equal risk of gain and of loss, if you had only to gain two lives, instead
of one, you might still wager. But if there were three lives to gain, you
would have to play (since you are under the necessity of playing), and you
would be imprudent, when you are forced to play, not to chance your life to
gain three at a game where there is an equal risk of loss and gain. But
there is an eternity of life and happiness. And this being so, if there were
an infinity of chances, of which one only would be for you, you would still
be right in wagering one to win two, and you would act stupidly, being
obliged to play, by refusing to stake one life against three at a game in
which out of an infinity of chances there is one for you, if there were an
infinity of an infinitely happy life to gain. But there is here an infinity
of an infinitely happy life to gain, a chance of gain against a finite
number of chances of loss, and what you stake is finite. It is all divided;
where-ever the infinite is and there is not an infi
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