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all sedition is prevented, if
this can be made intelligible and it be understood what is the proper
definition of justice.
327. The world is a good judge of things, for it is in natural ignorance,
which is man's true state. The sciences have two extremes which meet. The
first is the pure natural ignorance in which all men find themselves at
birth. The other extreme is that reached by great intellects, who, having
run through all that men can know, find they know nothing, and come back
again to that same ignorance from which they set out; but this is a learned
ignorance which is conscious of itself. Those between the two, who have
departed from natural ignorance and not been able to reach the other, have
some smattering of this vain knowledge and pretend to be wise. These trouble
the world and are bad judges of everything. The people and the wise
constitute the world; these despise it, and are despised. They judge badly
of everything, and the world judges rightly of them.
328. The reason of effects.--Continual alternation of pro and con.
We have, then, shown that man is foolish, by the estimation he makes of
things which are not essential; and all these opinions are destroyed. We
have next shown that all these opinions are very sound and that thus, since
all these vanities are well founded, the people are not so foolish as is
said. And so we have destroyed the opinion which destroyed that of the
people.
But we must now destroy this last proposition and show that it remains
always true that the people are foolish, though their opi
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