On 2009-11-19 10:23:53 AM, Till Maas wrote:
> So at least one major security protection measure is not in place and
> attackers can create their own repositories with signed packages that
> have well known security flaws, e.g. a package with a bad setuid root
> binary, and install it, if it is not already installed in a newer
I might be wrong on this, but wouldn't the attacker need to trick
yum/packagekit into using the malicious repo first? I didn't think that
was allowed for non-root users.
Note that even if the repomd.xml files were signed, it'd be easy for an
attacker to just take an old one with a valid signature and host a repo
with outdated packages. I thought metalink
over https was supposed to address the problem of outdated repos though.
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